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Unions and Industrial Relations in Papua New Guinea 
Michael Hess and James Gissua * 
When Papua New Guinea became independent in 1975, it inherited the Australian 
system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration from its former colonial rulers. This system 
with the cenrnal reality it ascr.ibes to trade unions as the industrial representatives of workers 
has been under consider:able anack in both Aus~alia and New Zealand in recent years. In 
Papua New Guinea too its effectiveness .has not gone unquestioned. This paper seeks first 
to provide some background to understandil'g .the evolution of Papua New Guinea's industrial 
relations system and then looks in detail at some recent examples of its oper:ation. 
The historical background 
In the early 1960s the Australian colonial Administtation of the Territory of Papua and 
New ·Guinea (TPNG), as it was then, legislated for the introduction of a system of compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration. It did so agains·t a background of 60 years of paternalistic 
over-regulation of labour, in which only the Rabaul Strike of 1929 stands out as a direct 
challenge to employer and state authority (Gammage, 1975; Willis, 1970). Individual protes't 
against conditions of work h~ however, not been uncommon and the Administtation's 
paternalistic approach had inhibited the growth of a free labour market. The result was "a 
perpetual condition of labour crisis" (Rowley, 1958, p.524), in which Administration policy 
concentrated on the highly regulated plantation sector. Even in this area there was too little 
labour available and in the growing urban labour markets workers lac~ed the skills and 
commitment to successfully partner foreign capital in the tasks of economic development 
(Hess, 1983). 
Eventually it was the collective action of Port Moresby's workers which precipitated 
a reappraisal of government policy (Hess, 1982, p.50ft). Motivated by considerations of 
international and Australian domestic politics, the Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck, chose 
to ignore the advice of his own colonial bureaucracy as well as white settler opinion and 
legislated for a modem system of industrial regulation which included legalisation of unions. 
The two pieces of legislation prepared for this purpose were the Industrial Relations 
Ordinance and the Industrial Organisations Ordinance. Hasluck claimed that the legislation 
would allow Papua New Guineans to develop their own system of industrial negotiation. He 
would "clear a path but let them walk it" (Departnaent of Territories, 1961, p.6). In fact these 
ordinances have detenuined much of the subsequent shape of PNG industrial relations. They 
reversed the previous policy of suppressing dissatisfaction in favour of channelling it into 
acceptable paths. The fotmer ordinance made provision for Industry Councils, Boards of 
Inquiry and direct negotiation as ·well as compulsory conciliation and arbitration. The latter 
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legalised unions and offered them a dubious degree of protection from civil suit (Seddon, 
1968). The cost to unions was a series of controls over their structure and operation. The 
most serious of these were the powers to register and de-register vest~ed in the newly created 
office of the Industrial Registrar. 
The legislation was undoubtedly progressive in that it finally overcame the out-dated 
situation in which "the very idea of collective bargaining was almost a subversive one" 
(Rowley, 1968, p.7). Giving workers with little knowledge of industrial organisation the right 
to freedom of association was, howev.er, a negligible concession. With little possibility of 
unionism developing in rural areas the new legislation would con~ol plantation workers as 
completely as the old had. By providing acceptable channels for their grievances., it would 
deal much better with the dissatisfaction of urban workers. Furthetn1ore, the old fotrns of 
control, developed over the years of colonial rule, were no longer politically acceptable 
internationally and their value within PNG was .also being called in doubt by increasingly 
vocal nationalist sentiment. 
The newly legislated industrial relations system was tripartite in nature. Employers 
with five long established organisations welie well prepared for collective negotiations. The 
Administration had recently elevated its labour office to depat uoental status and was also well 
able to represent its viewpoint. There were, however, no unions ~capable of representing PNG 
workers in negotiations. It fell to the officers of the new Department of Labour and 
subsequently the Bureau of Industrial Organisations, which was created especially for the 
purpose, to 'encourage' the fot rnation of unions to fulftl the tripartite requirements of the 
industrial ~elations machinery. On paper they did this very successfully. 
Table 1: Register,ed unio.ns at independence 
Name 
Lae Workers' Association 
Madang District Workers A. 
Rabaul Workers' Association 
Public Service Association 
Wewak Workers' Association 
Port Moresby Misc. W.U. 
Wau-Bulolo Workers' Assoc 
~Goroka Workers' Association 
New Ireland District W.A. 
Nonhern District W.A. 
Police Association 
Western Highlands District W.A. 
Milne Bay District W.A. 
Bank Officers' Association 
Uni. of PNG Staff A. 
Manus District W.A. 
Tech. Institute Staff A. 
Abau District Worker's A. 
Date 
Registered 
27/8/63 
"' 
II 
17/1/64 
26/3/64 
22/5/64 
12/6/64 
25/8/64 
16/11/64 
19/2/65 
" 
10/5/65 
18/6/65 
16/6/67 
29/9/67 
10/10/67 
4/1/68 
4/3/68 
Type of 
Union 
Regional 
n 
n 
Industry 
Regional 
It 
It 
tt 
It 
II 
Industry 
Regional 
It 
Industry 
Staff As. 
Regional 
Staff As. 
Regional 
1963 
M'ship 
963 
349 
427 
10,309 
336 
245 
481 
209 
203 
130 
1,800 
124 
223 
162 
160 
225 
86 
97 
1974 
M'ship 
440 
130 
350 
15,880 
118 
1,081 
474 
25 
187 
123 
2,656 
20 
200 
205 
142 
134 
52 
350 
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Western District W.A. 25/10/68 .. 102 84 
B 'ville Catholic Teachers' A. 18/11/68 Staff As. 305 299 
Central District Building W.U. 28./1/69 Industry 725 800 
Central District Waterside W.U. tt It 277 125 
Senior Police Officers Guild 10{2/69 Staff As. 37 49 
West Sepik Disttict W.U. 4nt69 Regional 125 110 
Airline Employee's Association 4/11/69 Industry 65 160 
B/ville Mining Workers' Union 12/12/69 " 450 800 
Gulf District Workers' Association t3nno Regional 65 160 
B'ville General Workers' Union 2t1sno It 466 800 
Air Traffic Officers' Association 7/tono Industry 83 89 
Pon Moresby Clerical W.U. IO/ttno II 96 46 
Local Government Workers' A. 29/tn1 " 20 20 
Lombrum Naval Civilian W.A. 19nn1 House 162 250 
Kainanru Workers Association 26/3nt Regional 55 55 
PNG Teachers' Association t/4nt Industry 8,430 9,869 
Air Hostesses' Association 1s1sn1 II 175 150 
Merchant Service ,Officers' A. 24/9n1 II 32 31 
Central District Tnmsport W.U. 3o13n2 " 24 24 
PNG Nurses' Association 12112n2 " 174 148 
Lae Stevedoring Union II " 657 657 
PNG Overseas Seamen's Union II " 28 28 
Madang Waterside Workers' Union fl " 70 94 
PNG Airpilots' Association 8tsn3 "' n.a. 100 
Mendi Workers' Association I3tsn4 Regional n.a. 200 
Morobe District 'Rural W.A. 26nn4 II n.a. 50 
Aircraft Engineer Association 15/10n4 Industry n.a. n.a. 
Broadcasting Staff Association 24/lns Staff As. n.a. 100 
West New Britain Workers A. It Regional n.a. 23 
Abbreviations: D. - District, U. - Union, W. - Workers, A. - Association, n.a. - not 
available. 
Sources: Industrial Registrar, Files 0-001 to 0-052. 
Table 1 presents a statistical summary of union development between 1963 when the 
legislation became effective and 1975 when PNG became independent In this period 47 
unions were registered under the Industrial Organisations Oniinance. Despite this impressive 
record of cteating unions there must be serious doubts about whether they had the ability to 
be really effective in pursuing their members' industrial interests. Three factors with potential 
impact on organisational effectiveness are immediately evident. The frrst is the extremely 
small size of the unions. Of the 47 registered in 1975 only eight had more than 500 
members. The effect of this on the ability of unions ro be genuine parties to collective 
negotiation may be judged by the contemporary estimate that 300 was the absolute minimum 
membership for fmancial viability (Martin, 1969). The second factor is the general and 
regional character of union coverage. Half of the registered unions were regionally based 
general workers' associations. Their notional coverage extended to all wor~ers in their 
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r~egion, who were not petrnanent public servants. In practice these organisations had little 
chance of developing more than a token presence in the many small and scattered 
workplaces which such a coverage implied. They tended to be concentrat~ed in one or two 
workplaces of the major employers of casual labour such as the wharves or Public Works 
Offices of their ~egional centres. 'The third factor of note, revealed in the comparison of 
average membership with that of 1974, is that membership was subject to wild fluctuations. 
Whether this was due to workers' lack of understanding of the "proper" role of unions 
(Patterson, 1969, p.26), their "unfamiliarity with an association which requires periodic 
renewal of membership by cash subscription" (Deech, 1976, p.15), or the new organisations' 
failure to hold on to '"frrst fervour' recruits" (Plowman, 1978, p.6) such marked instability 
would clearly have had an adverse ~effect on the unions' organisational capacity. 
Only three of the regional workers' associations have atuacted detailed study 
(Metcalfe, 1968; Stevenson, 1986; Hess, 1982). A common picture emerges from these 
studies of capable, ambitious leaders establishing unions with enthusiastic work~er suppon but 
moving quickly on to the national political stage. Deprived of constant contact with these 
leaders the associations were unable to represent their members in mundane matters. Nor 
were they abl~e to meet their obligations under the Industrial Organisations ilidinance. Their 
membership lists were rarely accurate and they often failed to carry out the relatively simple 
clerical tasks of conducting annual elections and audits. They were not, however, 
de-registered, but were propped up by the Deparnnent of Labour to fulfil, on paper at least, 
the tripartite requirements of the industrial relations system. Commentators have pointed out 
that this poor level of union development undertnined the machinery's potential for dispute 
resolution and wage fixing (Isaac, 1968) and have variously blamed the colonial background 
(Rowley, 1968), workers' lack of education (Bailey, 1970), their "misconceptions" about how 
unions should operate (Patterson, 1969) and poor leadership (Chapman, 1969). Less attention 
has been paid to the handful of exceptional organisations which were able to develop both 
the membership and leadership prerequisites for effective operntion within the system of 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration ((Spaull, 1974; Hess, 1986). 
At independence PN~G's industrial relations system was a decade old. It operated at 
several levels and its degree of success varied from level to level. In the workplace it was, 
with a few notable exc~eptions, irrelevant In the public sector only the Public Service 
Association and the Teachers' Association were organisationally competent. In private 
industry only the Bougainville unions and the Central District Waterside Work~ers' Union 
were able to represent their members in the workplace. A larger number of unions were able 
to participate in the system at the level of award making through the intervention of absentee 
leaders. Their industrial action ·was generally limited to the agreements such leaders made 
with employers which ensured their members received flow-ons from major awards and 
periodic minimum wag~e increases. Few unions were well enough organised to negotiate over 
a wider range of issues or to deploy the weapons of industrial action in support of their 
demands. Only at the most general level of wage fixing, where direct union input was limited 
to the appearance of a few advocates, was the system really successful. In 1972 amendments 
to the Industrial Relations Ordinance strengthened the role of such 'outside' union leaders by 
making Minimum Wages Boards the centre piece of the wage fixing system. The minimum 
urban and rural rates fixed by this tribunal were to have a seminal effect through flow-ons. 
Unions which chose to participate in the hearings could do so by engaging a competent 
advocate while those that did not could merely apply to have their awards altered to confotnl 
with the new national minimums. 
In summary then, the industrial relations system inherited by PNG at independence 
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was at its most successful at a bureauc1 atic level. As a mechanism for articulating and 
resolving industrial grievances in the workplace it was frustrated by a lack of adequate union 
organisation. 
Trends in Papua New Guinea unionism 
An instructive example of how union weakness continued to inhibit the development 
of effective industrial relations mechanisms is revealed in the history of PN~G's peak union 
council. This began in the mid-1960s as the Federation of Workers' Associations (FWA) 
(Hess, 1988). It was set up by a coalition of interests comprising the colonial officers 
charged with overseeing the operation of the industrial 11elations system and the emerging 
national Papua New ,Guinean politicians, who were the leaders of the small regionally based 
general workers' associations. For the fotmer it represented an opportunity to enhance the 
operation of the system by creating a peak union body which would have the educated 
leadership and resourees they saw as a necessary prerequisite to the operation of the tripartite 
industrial relations machinery,. For the latter it was a chance to strut the developing national 
political stage. 
Despite continued suppon from the Depatuuent of Labour and occasional interest from 
the Australian Council of Trade Unions the FW A achieved only an ephemeral exist·ence 
through the late 1960s. By the early 1970s it ·was strong enough to act as a channel for wage 
claims but had no genuine capacity for action outside the industrial relations machinery 
(Langmo1e, 1973. p.l69). For the politicians and Depaabuent of Labour officials who had 
supported its establishment this was not necessarily a bad outcome. The politicians had 
gained a national institution which they could be seen to lead and the industrial relations 
bureaucrats gained an organisation which enhanced the operation of the machinery they were 
called upon to administer. While neither would need to call upon it very often, the Federation 
provided for both groups a vehicle to transport industrial issues to the nationall~evel at which 
they were most comfonable. The lack of genuine worker participation in the organisation 
also meant that it was unlikely to prove troublesona.e to either the politicians or the 
bureaucrats. It was, however, of very little real use to the worlc~ers. Its utility for the 
industrial relations system was limited to preserving the fiction of tripartism, when in fact 
it did not genuinely represent ordinary workers at all. 
In 1973 the organisation began to change as it came under the influence of younger 
PANGU Pany activists, who wen: at this rime radical nationalists. For the next decade 
PNG's peak union council was dominated by Tony lla. lla was the Member of Parliament 
for Lae and a PANGU stalwart. He began by changing the name of the FW A to the Trade 
Union Congress (PNGTUC) and moved its headquarters to Lae (Hess, 1992). While lla did 
enhance the organisation's capacity for action, his principal motivation appears to have been 
political rather than industrial. Certainly the PNGTUC was much more active in his own 
electorate than anywhere else! 
As Ila moved, along with the PANGU Party, into government his politics became 
more conservativ·e. He rejected overtures from the left-wing World Federation of Trade 
Unions and led PN~G unionism into a close international association with the rival, 
anti-communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. This anti-communist 
agenda was further strengthened by his desire to work closely with the American Federation 
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of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations international aid agency the America-Asia Free 
.Labor Institute. This organisation had a quite open agenda of supporting those unions in the 
Asia-Pacific region which would adopt a staunchly anti-communist position. Despite the 
paranoid statements of Australian 'intelligence' authorities there was no communist political 
influence in PNG. lla was nonetheless able to use the Americans as a source of finance. 
With their aid he built a PNGTUC office and workers' club complex and a medical centre 
in the suburbs of Lae. He also, perhaps because of the United States influence, sought to take 
the PNGTUC along the road of business unionism with proposals ranging from ownership of 
food processing companies to operating a travel agency and a five star hotel. None of these 
proposals came to anything but they used up a great deal of time and energy. They were 
allied with lla' s rise to national political prominence and after he became Minister for Labour 
in the late 1970s the confusion between union and business activity became even more 
pronounced. For long periods the PNGTUC's only activity was in this area of business 
schemes, while worker's wages and conditions were neglected. The best that can be said of 
lla's dual role as Minister for Labour and President of the PNGTUC is that his lack of 
differentiation, in undertaking the two apparently contradictory roles, made it possible for 
deparuuent officers to directly aid unions. The fact was, naturally enough, that this aid was 
directed towards enhancing the operation of the industrial relations system rather than 
pursuing the interests of the workers. It also reduced the unions to dependence on the 
government officials. 
There is, however, little evidence that any large number of PNG unionists thought that 
this was in any way improper. Indeed there was considerable popular support for Ila 's 
leadership during this period in which he was seen by many workers as their best hope. By 
the ,early 1980s the situation had changed. PANGU was out of government and Ila 's hold 
oyer the PNGTUC affiliates, which had been sustained by the distribution of government 
fmanced gifts, such as conference trips and study tours, lapsed. The more militant and 
effective Pon Moresby unions allied with the Bougainville Mine Workers' Union moved to 
have lla replaced and Henry Moses of the BMWU became PNGTU~C president in 1983. In 
order to understand the significance of these events it is necessary to make a brief detour 
from the history of the peak council and look at some individual unions which were operating 
successfully. 
The PNGTUC represented only private sector unions and its main strength came from 
the weak regionally based workers' associations. These were not, however, PNG's only 
private sector unions. Two organisations which had chosen a different path and had proven 
·more ~effective w,ere the BMWU and the Central District Waterside Workers' Union 
(CDWWU). The fo11ner was based at Bougainville ,Copper Limited's gigantic copper mine 
at Panguna. It cov,ered all wages employees and was led by the late Henry Moses, who was 
also a leader of the landowning clan at P,anguna. The BMWU may have been kick started 
in its attempts to organise the PNG workforce by the example of industrial negotiation set by 
militant Australian unionists during the mine's construction phase. By the mid 1970s it had 
developed into a fotnlidable union, which was very much a legitimate pan of both BCL's 
operation and life at Panguna and Arawa. 
The CDWWU had follow,ed a more torturous path and this has been described at 
length elsewhere (Hess,l986). Very briefly it grew out of the ruins of the Port Moresby 
Workers' Association which had promised much to urban workers but had collapsed in the 
late 1960s. The waterside workers decided that they would be better off in their own union. 
Their first l~eader was an aspiring local politician, Gavera Rea. When he w,ent into parliament 
in the 1972 el~ections he introduced a young Australian, R,eg McAlister, to the waterside 
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workers as a possible replacement. Earlier in the year, McAlister had created a public 
sensation when he crossed the lines of race to become an activist in the Clerical and Shop 
Assistant's Union. 
McAlister was just the leader Port Moresby's waterside workers were looking for. His 
willingness to take militant action matched their mood He also brought to them an 
understanding of industrial tactics, which had previously been lacking. The CDWWU 
embarked on a campaign to refot m the casual system of employment. A major strike in 1972 
caused the government to create a Boaro of Inquiry into the system of employment on Port 
Motesby's waterfront. Assisted by the advocacy of Notm Docker of the Australian Waterside 
Workers' Federation (WWF), the union used the inquiry as pan of a broad campaign. With 
funher industrial action and a well argued case it achieved a major victory. The casual 
system of employu aent was replaced by a register of watersiders, a roster to equalise work 
opportunities and the payment of attendance money for those nQt required for work on a 
particular day. The employers' rights to both hire and fire as they wished were severely 
restricted with major increases in wage rares and improvements in working conditions also 
being achieved. 
No other PNG union had or has been able to achieve so much. Certainly the time was 
favourable to the union.. With the Whitlam government forcing the pace on the granting of 
independence and the upsurge of nationalist feeling of the period, tribunals of Papua Ne·w 
Guinean officials were ready to hear the case of a union of their fellow countrymen struggling 
against the outdated colonial management practices of foreign companies. But no other union 
was able to take anything like the advantage of this situation and much Ciiedit must go to 
McAlister and the CDWWU officials of this period and to the WWF, which provided strong 
logistical support through Notm Docker's advocacy. 
ln 1982 the CDWWU crowned a decade of achievement with the amalgamation of 
maritime unions in Port Moresby, I .ae, Rabaul and Madang to fo1m the PNG Waterside 
Workers' and Seamen's Union (WWSU). Its registration was strongly opposed by employers 
and their parliamentary allies but the experience of the CDWWU officials in using the 
industrial relations machinery enabled the unionists to prevail. The WWSU was the frrst and 
is to date PN',G's only national organisation of private sector workers. 
In the public sector both the Public Employees Association (PEA) and the PNG 
Teachers' Association (PNGTA) inherited some useful situations from the unions of colonial 
officials they replaced. The early history of the PNGTA has been described by an Australian 
unionist, who was involved in assistance to the organisation in the early 1970s (Spaull, 1974). 
It dev,eloped out of colonial structures, which represented Australian t~eachers in TPNG. As 
the teaching service became increasingly 'localised' Papua New Guinean teachers attempted 
to fotm their own organisations. The fus4 the Local Teachers Association, collapsed when 
its leader, Vincent Eri, was sent on a long overseas trip by the colonial Administration. The 
PNGTA was, however, able to overcome the problems of dependence upon a single individual 
and during the early 1970s, as PNG moved towards full independence it emerged as a well 
resourced and moderately successful union. 'The PEA evolved even more directly from its 
colonial predecessor. In the 1970s, when it was still dominated by Australian colonial 
officials, it had embarked upon demands for equal pay for PNG public servants doing the 
same jobs as their white colleagues. At the saute time it was heavily involved in negotiating 
retrenchment packages for the colonial officers themselves. 
Unfortunately for PN,G unionism the PEA and PNGTA continued to stand aloof from 
the PNGTUC. The BMWU and the WWSU, how,ever, became important factors in refouuing 
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the moribund peak council. In 1985 this process received a huge boost with a major 
assistance package from the ICF'I'U-Asia Pacific Regional Office. They agr~eed to fund a 
three year organisational program under which it was intended that the PNGTUC become a 
viable and independent organisation. The program included the secondment of a full-time 
officer for a year to 'monitor' progress and the establishment of a properly staffed office. 
With the appointment of Lawrence Titimur as General Secretary, John Paska as Rese~ch 
Officer and with Reg McAlister acting as Assistant Secretary, the PN~GTUC began to look 
like a genuine national union centre. 
So impressive w~ere the gains under the new leadership that by 1987 both the PEA and 
the PNGTA had affiliated. An indication of the ,growth in support can be seen in Table 2. 
Between 1985 and 1989 the PNGTUC went from representing 12 unions with a total 
membership of 17,500 to having 40 affiliates with a total claimed membership of 70,000. 
This gave the PNGTUC the right to claim to represent the interests of 33 per cent of the total 
workforce. At last PNG seemed to have a real union structure, which would bring ·worker 
views into the economic decision making process in a genuine way. 
Table 2: PNGTU~C affiliation, 1985-1989 
year 
1985 
1988 
1989 
affiliates 
12 
28 
40 
·members 
17,500 
60,000 
70,000 
%unions 
22% 
75% 
82% 
%workforce 
8% 
28% 
33% 
Source: PNGTU~C, Secretariat and activities ~eport, December 1989. 
That this unity was fragile became apparent in the following year when frrst the PEA 
and then the PNGT A refused to pay affiliation fees on the ,ground that the PNGTUC was not 
doing enough for their members. In fact the motives were political. The large public sector 
unions had expected, ·with some reason, that they would becorne the dominant forces in the 
.reformed PNGTUC. Tirimur had resisted this as an infringement of his own authority. The 
PEA., in particular, had an equally deteuoined leader in Napoleon Liosi, who felt that he 
should have a greater role in PNGTUC affairs than Titimur was allowing. 
In 1991 the argument was still going on with cooler heads on both sides trying to 
establish a fo1mula by which the large public sector unions could bring their r~esources into 
the PNGTUC without completely dominating it.. The future success of the organisation 
depends heavily upon the outcome. 
A final trend wonh noting in the recent development of PNG unions is the 
establishment of a Federation of Airline Workers' Unions. This was achieved in 1991 and 
was based on a working relationship which had been developed between the National Union 
of Airline Employees and other unions in the industry covering stewards, engineers and air 
traffic controllers. The pilots, union has remained outside the Federation but has cooperated 
with it in some areas. 
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Industrial disputation in the 1980s 
In general the levels of industrial disputes in PN G have been low. The statistical 
picture for 1985 is fairly typical. Of 33 strikes reponed by the Department of Labour and 
Employtncnt, 22 occurred in primary production; 12 lasted less than one day and 18 less than 
two days; 20 were settled by voluntary ~conciliation through a third pany, usually an officer 
of the DepcunttGnt (Depmtuaent of Labour, 1986). The majority of stti.kes, then, occurred on 
plantations where unions are either non-existent or poorly organised and were of shon 
duration. This points to their character as protest actions designed to attract the attention of 
someone who could address the workers' grievances. That such strikes were generally settled 
by conciliation by officers of the Dep8.1l•••ent of Labour adds to the view that their purpose 
was essentially to get the industrial relatio1 ' S machinery moving on an issue which workers 
had no other way of addressing. 
There hav,e, howev~er, been exceptions and it is the few longer disputes, which 
occurred as pan of an industrial campaign and went through the full gamut of industrial 
dispute mechanisms which tell us most about the operation of the system itself. Here we 
wish to present brief accounts of two such disputes, which reveal some fundamental issues 
in the effectiveness of PNG 's industrial relations processes. 
The 1988 Ok Tedi dispute 
The Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) operates a gold and copper mine at Mt. Fubilan in 
the Star Mountains of the Western Province in PNG. Since 1985 the mine has been managed 
by Australia's Broken Hill Proprietary Limited (BHP), which is the major partner in a 
consortium including German and US interests. This mine is located in one of the more 
underdeveloped and remot~e pans of the country. The area was first ~contacted by government 
officials in 1963 and when mining occurred in 1982 no real 'development' had taken place. 
By 1988, however, the mining township of Tabubil had a population of 3,500, about 50 per 
cent of whom were mine employees and their dependents, with the other 50 per cent being 
made up of sub-contractors and government personneL 
Most PNG blue collar workers were members of the Ok Tedi Mining Construction and 
General Workers Union (GWU). In 1988, the GWU had about 1,400 members. An industrial 
a~ment, which had been re-negotiated over the yeus, provided the members with some of 
the most attractive conditions of employment in the country. There were several issues, 
however, which had remained unaddressed in this award and had the potential for causing 
major disputes. 
The frrst was housing. Successive negotiations with the company over the years had 
not produced any significant results. The limited number of houses that were available had 
all been allocated to members of staff according to an allocation policy, which favoured the 
higher levels of management and therefore the foreign employees. For many union members 
the lack of housing had meant years of separation from their families. OTML refused to 
build more houses for three reasons. Firstly, world copper prices had declined to an extent 
where the repayment of its loans had become difficult to maintain while at the same time 
interests on its loans increased. Secondly, the banks would not approve any more loans in 
view of its tight financial situation. Thirdly, even if them were funds available, it might be 
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difficult to build any more houses given the local geography. 
Another issue of concern to the union related to training and localisation. All other 
private sector furns in PNG which employ foreign labour, are required every three years to 
provide progressive repons to the Depw unent of Labour and Employment and state when 
particular positions could be localised On numerous occasions, the union accused OTML 
of failing to fulfil its training and localisation plans thereby unduly limiting promotional 
opponunities for union members. 
A final immedia~e issue in 1988 was the sudden introduction of a three shift system 
to increase prrxiuction. The union blamed the Executiv~e Manager (Mines), Rick Gazzard~ 
and the Employee Relations Manager, Bebea Konie for lack of consultation in the changes 
and demanded the termination of these two members of management. It was this tetnlination 
de.mand plus the long running issues of housing and localisation, which triggered one of the 
most difficult disputes PNG' s industrial relations system has had to face. 
The strik!e commenced with 70 operators of heavy equipment at the mine pit walking 
out for three days on 18 July 1988. These workers were the most skilled of the PNG 
workforce and were employed alongside foreign workers brought into the country on account 
of their skills. They were also ~experienced miners with an understanding of industrial issues 
and action derived from work on mines such as Bougainville Copper Limited's Panguna 
operation. The operators struck without the company or the union executive knowing and 
described their action as a protest against the 'dictatorial' approach by Gazzard in attempting 
to control their work routines right down to the minute details. They also questioned 
management about the hasty manner by which major changes, such as the second shift, had 
been introduced .. . Demands for more housing as well as for better promotional opportunities 
were also raised. Since there had been neither the prescribed secret ballot nor any 
involvement of the union's elected officials the strike was considered illegal by the 
Department of Labour and Employment 
When the union executive agreed to take up the issues with the company the operators 
returned to work. The union-management negotiations between 22 July and 17 August failed 
to reach an agreement. ~On the one hand, the union insisted that a PN~G national Kipling 
Uiari, Ex~ecutive Manager (Public Affairs) lead the management team in plaoe of the 
expatriate Executive Manager (Personnel), ·warren Pearson. On the other hand, the company 
adopted a non-negotiable stance on the tenoination issue claiming absolute n1anagement 
prerogative to "hlre and fire". Some progress was made on the issue of housing with the 
company agreeing to build 20 new houses but this fell well short of the union's demand for 
500. The issue of localisation had been transfotmed into a question of reclassification but no 
progress was made on this. 
Both sides realised the inevitability of further industrial action. On 1 August Uiari 
asked the Depwuuent of Labour and Employment to intervene. While the union requested 
that the Industrial Registrar conduct a sec11et ballot on the question of further srrike action, 
the local MP, Bob Bubec, a fotmer OTML employee himself also got involved, meeting with 
the union executive on 2 August. The ballot overwhelmingly endorsed the proposed strike, 
which took place between 18 and 30 August. Union leaders, company security personnel and 
the 20 local police maintained order and the strike was peaceful. However, it achieved little 
for the union. The company's response to its demand on tettnination did not change while 
no progress was made on the housing and reclassification issues. 
During the strike major weaknesses in the industrial relations machinery were evident. 
The major one was that the union ,executive had no strategic plan. It seemed unaware of the 
implications of its actions, did not really want the strike and had no facilities for supponing 
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members during a long dispute. The Depaxunent of Labour and Employment was equally 
unprepa!ied. A compulsory conference and the establishment of a board of inquiry had been 
considered but a number of problems prevented use of one of these options. Firstly, the 
tetmination demand was considered a non-industrial matter within the meaning of the 
Industrial Organisations Act and therefore, could not be dealt with using the formal industrial 
relations machinery. The demand had been also considered as interfering with one of the 
fundamental rights of management prerogatives. Secondly, both panies appeared not to 
favour arbitration as a suitable option. Despite the fact that hafdly any consistent approach 
had been adopted by way of negotiations between the panies, both expressed optimism about 
a settlement through negotiations. lbi!idly, the company had been reluctant to accept the idea 
of a board of inquiry with wide powers to investigate its industrial and personnel policies. 
The strikers returned to work on 31 August on the understanding that further 
negotiations had been arranged for 14 September in Pon Moresby in which the company 
would produce a detailed proposal on housing and reclassification while the ternrination 
demand would be dealt with by a board of inquiry. The company initially requested a five 
day delay to the scheduled ,meeting and then failed to produce its ~detailed proposals. When 
the company did produce its plan on 21 September it included an increase to 230 new houses 
plus a marginal low,ering of the eligibility classification. The union took the delays as an 
indication of lack of serious intent on the company's part and rejected the offer. It did accept 
the Department's suggestion that a board of inquiry be established but asked that it not only 
investigate the teuoination demand but also look at the entire operations of the company with 
particular attention to labour and employment ,matters. 
On 22 September unexpected industrial action bro~e out and vinually destroyed any 
chance of the parties arriving at a settlement through the conciliation process. In the early 
hours of that morning, a number of front ~end loaders and semi-trailers were used by the 
striking workers to close all roads and the airpon. Trenches we~e dug across the main roads 
into the town, barricades were erected and the main telecommunication cables were cut. 
Liquor outlets were broken into and the hotel building was vandalised. C~mpany vehicles 
were overturned while the golf and hash house harriers clubs, which were the preserves of 
the largely whire expatriate workforce were burnt down. Threats were made against the 
company's main office complex, commonly known as the "White House" and some 
expatriates complained of being physically harassed for having crossed the barricades (Niugini 
Nius, 23 Seprember 1988). 
The government's reaction was predictable. The frrst contingent of riot police arrived 
at Tabubil on 23 September and within three days there were 300 policemen and Defence 
Force soldiers in the town. A five member team of national politicians and senior bureaucrats 
arrived at Tabubil from Port Moresby on September 26 to investigate the situation. The 
team, headed by Father John Momis, Minister for Decentralisation, met with all the panies 
and soon after, endorsed the proposition that a board of inquiry be established immediately 
to investigate the dispute and submit its report to the National Executive Council. The 
company continued to reject the suggestion that the board investigate all aspects of its 
operations but no longer had any choice. A compulsory conference was convened on 30 
September to endorse the option for a board of inquiry and fotmally request the Depa1unent 
of Labour and Employment ~o arrange for the board to be established. The strikers returned 
to work on 1 October and the union accepted the company's offer in respect to housing. 
The three main issues facing the board of inquiry were the tetnaination demand, 
housing and training and localisation. The board wound up its fotrual hearings on 28 October 
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and presented its report to the Minister on 18 November. The board's report contained 38 
recommendations and also identified certain weaknesses within the company, the union, the 
Departments of Labour and Employment and Minerals and Energy. These organisations were 
dir~ect.ed by the board to implement relevant recommendations which pertain to their special 
areas of responsibility. In respect of the tern•ination demancL the board acknowledged the 
technical qualifications and expertise of Gazzard but concluded that "he has not been oriented 
to the proper and appropriate management sty l~e and has an attitude intolerant to other's ideas" 
(Board of Inquiry, 1988, p.98). On this basis., the board recommended that in the event of 
any further industrial unrest resulting from his behaviour, BHP management should have him 
replaced. In the case of Konie, the board observ~ed how he had been handicapped by "the 
~expatriate dominated Personnel management'' and also how he had been "bypassed by 
Operations management" which prevented him from perfot••ting his functions effectively. The 
board recommended that the Employee Relations Manager have the discretion of direct 
access to the General Manager over im1.,onant industrial relations matters. The board also 
recognised the need for adequa~e manpower and budgetary support for the ~efficient operations 
of the Employee R~elations Depru unent. Furthexn1ore, the board recommended that both 
Gazzard and Konie fonnally apologise to the workers for their roles which partly precipitated 
the series of industrial actions. 
The board merely endorsed the new Housing Agreement arrived at between the parties 
in October but emphasised the need to upgrade f:emale accommodation and recreational 
amenities and the introduction of a low cost home ownership scheme for employees below 
grade 6. While the board endorsed the October agreement on a 10 grade snucture, it 
identified the lack of progress and implementation of training and localisation programmes 
to have been a major impediment. The board recommended that no further work-peunits be 
granted to the company by the Department of Labour and Employment until a number of 
necessary adjustments were made within the company to ensure training and localisation 
programmes were impl~emented. 
The dispute which had such a spectacular beginning and involved major State 
interv~ention - including the deployment of riot police - was eff:ectively ~ended by the almost 
mundane proceedings of the Board of Inquiry,. The issue this raises is: if the issues were 
resolvable by such an orderly means, why was it necessary for the dispute to take such a 
confrontationary and costly course to begin with? The simple answer offered by the General 
Secretary of the PNGTUC was that, "without that action the issues would never have been 
addressed" (lnteiView, Titimur). At the very least, the fact that PNG' s leading union official 
had such an attitude indicates that the industrial relations system is in some difficulty. If 
management and the industrial relations bureaucracy require the ~erection of barricades, arson 
and looting to take place before they move on worker grievances there is good reason to 
believe that the nation's labour relations are in deep trouble. 
The 1'987 Air Niugini dispute 
By contrast the 1987 Air Niugini dispute was a dull affair. There were no strikes, no riotous 
behaviour and no police intervention. Nonetheless the course of the dispute reveals some of 
the same weaknesses in industrial relations as were evident at Ok Tedi. 
Air Niugini is PNG's national airline and has been in operation since 1976, a year 
after national independence. It controls a majority of the domestic market and remains the 
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only PNG airline petrnitted to operate international routes. Despite this market prominence, 
Air Niugini has faced mounting criticism. Declining profits in the early 1980s led to a series 
of management reviews by foreign expet ts and its own management had been alleged to be 
inefficient with scandals such as a major fraud uncovered in 1988, where it was estimated that 
between $200,000 and $300,000 had been syphoned from Air Niugini every year since 1984 
(Post Courier, 24 June 1988) adding to management woes. 
While Air Niugini management had been desperately trying to identify ways to make 
the airline a profitable organisation, the gowth of trade union activity in the mid-1980s posed 
another challenge. Up to 1982, all industrial relations functions had been under the 
Department of Personnel but by 1985 it became necessary for management to aeate an 
Industrial Relations Depaxbuent. Whereas most PNG employers face enterprise or company 
unions Air Niugini' s employees were organised into three craft and one general union 
covering pilots, engineers, flight attendants and general employees, all with their own 
industtial awards. The largest of these unions, the National Airline Employees Association 
(NAEA), was fotmed in 1986 as a result of an amalgamation of the National Salaried 
Officers' Association and the National Graded Officers' Association, to cover Air Niugini's 
administrative and other non-engineering ground staff. In 1987 the NAEA took its 
organisation a step further with the appointment of Reg McAlister as its full-time General 
Secretary. McAlister~s outstanding record in PNG unionism has already been mentioned. He 
brought to the NAEA a knowledge of industrial tactics based on almost two decades of 
successful union leadership. 
At this time Air Niugini's Industrial .&elations Mana,ger was Lawrence Pukali. Despite 
his fiv,e years in the job and his legal training, Pukali seems to have been ill equipped to deal 
with an increasingly militant union. In 1987, Air Niugini had recruited additional industrial 
relations staff as a direct response to the growth of its unions and a perceived likelihood of 
an increase in industrial disputation. The truth of this peiCeption may be seen in the fact that 
in the three years 1985-7 the company had experienced only 20 disputes, whereas in the two 
years 1988-89 it reponed 47 disputes (Department of Labour, 1989). 
Under Air Niugini' s unitarist management approach any employee found to infringe 
management policies had to be terrninated so that in the long run only loyal and committed 
employees would remain. Once the workforce achieved some measure of industrial 
representation such .a policy was bound to lead to a rapid escalation in disputes. An example 
of the type of dispute this situation created may be seen in the 1987 case of Peter Simbago, 
demoted for negligence. It just happened that Simbago was the NEAE's president and there 
was no way that an inc1easingly organised union was going to accept that this ·was not an act 
of victimisation. It took two years befm.e this case was settled at arbitration and during this 
lengthy delay the management tactic of reviewing decisions and not seeking a settlement gave 
the newly active unionists of the NAEA ample scope for developing a hostile attitude on the 
basis that they might be next. 
The details of the case reveal that even in the public sector PNG management has a 
long way to go before it achieves a cooperative relationship with its workforce. In 1987, 
Peter Simbago was Passenger Handling Supervisor, a position he had held for over 18 months 
after nine years with Air Niugini. His duties included: 
-controlling check-in counters 
- ensuring check-in traffic flows smoothly 
- ensuring all international transit passengers have proper visas 
- ensuring proper collection of excess baggage fees and 
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- responsibility for two senior and 16 junior staff. 
He had been President of NAEA for about eight months and had been re-elected to 
serve for a second te1 rn. He was part of the movement which was revitalising the union and 
had brought McAlister into it's leadership to give it the industrial experience the rank and file 
officials lacked. 
Simbago's demotion arose from his use of supervisory discretion in respect of a traffic 
officer., who had breached company practi~ce in the use of concessional travel to return to his 
home province for a short period. The officer had arranged his leave coxrectly but had 
travelled on a non-approv~ed flight without a ticket. He had done this after previously 
arranging with Simbago, his supervisor, that he would in fact travel on an approved flight. 
Simbago was unaware that the officer had altered his plans. Under the circumstances, 
Simbago resorted to his discretionary powers, a privilege bestowed on supervisors which he 
had not used for sometime. He picked-up the officer's pay, paid for his return tickets and 
arranged for his 'travel back to Port Moresby. In view of his use of supervisor's discretion, 
he was content about his actions and considered it not necessary to report the traffic officer's 
infringement of policy. 
Air Niugini suspended Simbago the day after the officer's return and demoted him 
from the position of Passenger Handling Supervisor Grade 7.2 to Traffic Officer Grade 3.5 
a week later (ANG, 1987). The decision by Air Niugini to have Simbago demoted had been 
the result of an investigation conducted by the Industrial Relations Department. The 
investigation report concluded that Simbago had condoned the officer's actions when he 
collected his pay, paid for his fares and airline tickets and failed to report the matter to the 
Airport M.anager. How~ever, the union disputed the fmdings of the investigators on the basis 
that Sjmbago had never been provided an opportunity to submit his views. 
It took ten months before the union notified the Depa.r unent of Labour and 
Employment of the existence of an industrial dispute. The delay was apparently due to the 
union's waiting for management to implement its own stated procedures. Official company 
policy was that demotions were to be reviewed every three to six months with reinstatements 
to fotmer positions based on perfounance. In this case, Air Niugini had not earned out such 
a review for 11 months and Simbago had al.Jieady rec~eived excellent repons from his superiors 
in respect of a number of higher duties he had perfotmed in acting capacities. In the 
circumstances management's unwillingness to reinstat~e Simbago added to union suspicions 
about the motive for his demotion. 
All conciliation attempts failed and on July 27, 1989 the Secretary of the Department 
of Labour and Employment recommended to the Minister the establishment of an arbitration 
tribunal for a decision on the dispute. The nibunal,s 'tenus of reference had been "to concern 
itself with the justification of the demotion of Simbago with a vi~ew to have him reinstated 
or otherwise" (Depcuunent of Labour, 1989). The union's submission rested on two major 
points. Firstly, in response to Air Niugini's argument about Simbago having condoned the 
officer's actions, the union argued that he had been unaware of the change of plan which gave 
rise to the infringements and that he had used his discretion to up-hold Air Niugini policy. 
Secondly, the union argued that Air Niugini had breached its own policy about reviews on 
demotion cases in failing to review Simbago's case after three and six months, particularly 
when all the repons about his perfonnances appeared to have been excellent Furthennore, 
Air Niugini had failed to provide any justification as to why the review had nev~er taken place. 
'The thrust of Air Niugini's submission was that Simbago had breached a number of policies. 
These breaches included his failure to report to his superiors, boarding of an Air Niugini 
mcraft without a ticket and ignorance of safety standards. Although Simbago had not been 
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personally involved in the alleged breaches, these accusations were made on the basis that he 
had condoned the officer's actions in failing to report them. In respect of the failure to 
review Simbago's demotion, the company argued that it was giving Simbago reasonable time 
to pfove himself before a review was made. 
In its assessment, the tribunal considered Air Niugini's submission to lack substance. 
Its decision was that Simbago was t,o be reinstated to his foiu1er position as Supervisor 
Passenger Handling and was to be compensated financially for the period of his demotion and 
any other monetary benefits that mi,ght be owing to him. Air Niugini responded with a 
formal objection claiming that the tribunal's detetuaination was "unfair, biased and completely 
wrong". The Deparnnent of Labour and Employment responded and advised Air Niugini to 
seek a judicial review at the National Court if it strongly felt that the tribunal's decision had 
been a serious miscarriage of justice. Air Niugini lodged with the National Court an appeal 
but this was later withdrawn soon after Simbago resigned. 
As with the Ok Tedi dispute, the origin of the problem here lay in the lack of 
cooperative relations between the management and its workforce. That an employee of such 
standing would be treated as cavalierly as Simbago was is particularly incredible in view of 
the lack of experienced and skilled workers in the PNG labour market. Almost cenainJy 
management philosophy and Simbago's involvement in an increasingly militant union were 
the motives behind the particularly harsh action. As with the Ok Tedi dispute the ease with 
which the dispute was settled once the industrial relations machinery was set in motion points 
to the need for panies to have quicker access to the fouoal dispute settlement mechanisms. 
Conclusion 
This paper has looked at the development of PNG's industrial relations system and has 
provided brief details of a couple of examples of its recent operation. The purpose of this 
has been to highlight some of the difficulties facing the operation of the system. A major 
deficiency which emerges is the lack of attention to industrial relations in the management 
of enterprises. The disputes at Ok Tedi and Air Niugini simply should not have occurred and 
there is gcxxl reason to believe that they would not have occurred if industrial relations 
management in these ~enterprises had been efficient. The solution seems to have three parts. 
The fll'St pan clearly lies in having systematically trained industrial relations officers. Even 
the best training, however, will not overcome a management philosophy which neglects 
industrial relations and prevents industrial relations management from doing its job properly. 
The second pan of the solution relates to unions and their operation. With a couple of 
exceptions PNG has not developed unions capable of representing their members' interests. 
If the Ok Tedi General Workers' Union had done its job efficiently the operators would not 
have needed to take wildcat action to draw attention to their grievances. The final pan of the 
solution is to give disputants easy and rapid access to the industrial dispute settlement 
mechanisms. 
None of these solutions are without cost In particular the fotrual dispute machinery 
suffers greatly from under staffing and under resourcing. In the long run, however, the cost 
of unnecessary industrial disputes is likely to be much greater. 
• 
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